Worcester Hill
The attack on Worcester Hill, De la Rey's main offensive, was rescheduled for Monday the 12 th February. Worcester Koppies, held by several companies of the Worcester regiment, consisted of three koppies in line with each other - see map.
The koppie overlooks Slingersfontein to the south west, and Norval's Pont to the north east. It consists of 3 peaks - Pinnacle Hill to the south - Burnt Hill, more to the east, being the highest, with Observation or Signal Hill to the north. The centre hill extends for about 1400 m along the ridge.
The attack began at about 3 o'clock on Monday morning, as Van Dam's men advancing from the north and eastern sides of Burnt and Observation Hills, began pushing the Worcesters back towards Pinnacle Hill.
"Within seconds the hill, recently so quite, was, as one of the berghers said, like a broken ant hill,” one soldier reports. Once they had secured the positions - fires were set to inform De la Rey and the Boer Artillery of their whereabouts. Van Dam's report translated from Dutch:
“Several times Gen. de la Rey discussed the plans of attack with me. In front of us the plain stretched till at the foot of the rise that we had to cross. Thus we were exposed to the maxims long before we could reach the rise. It was uncertain if we would be able to get that far. I put that to de la Rey, also that I was of meaning that we should, in my opinion, attack from the northern point. And then I thought that we should attack at night, which will offer a better chance, with lesser or no losses.
My request was granted, and seeing that the next day was Sunday we extended the attack to the night of Sunday. That evening we received a message from Luit Oosthuyzen, that he drove the enemy out of a section of his camp, but he could do no more. Although the enemy used Liddites and grenades the position Oosthuyzen had was very good and there were no losses.”
De la Rey's main objective was a long koppie held by E Company of the 2nd Worcester Regiment. To defend this position on rocky difficult terrain, Major Stubbs broke E company up into sections and placed detached bodies of 4-8 men in strategic positions along the whole koppie. Lieutenant H J Bartholomew - No 1 section - posted 4-6 men in each of the three sangars on the east of Pinnacle Hill and Burnt Hill. No. 2 section were positioned behind sangars on the south end of Observation Hill and the head of the ravine. No. 3 section took up positions on the north side of this hill. The men of No. 4 section under Lieutenant Carr were positioned to the north of the whole. Captain Hovell commanding "A" and "C" companies was positioned on a ridge the left of "E" companies positions.
Major Stubbs and Major Edwards were concerned that the low, bush covered koppie close, to the east side of their position was occupied by Boers. They asked Hacket Pain's permission to take out a party and try to cut off the Boer piquet - their request was refused.
At dawn it was seen that a Boer gun had been positioned at Holle River Farm and another was being moved to some koppies on the north east. On a wooded koppie, about 2500 yards to the east, a large sanger was spotted. The Worcesters immediately set about securing their position. Two gun sites were established by Captain H Corbyn of J Battery. One was positioned on Observation Hill covering the Boer gun on the Holler River farm koppies. Another gun was set up north west of Pinnacle Hill and Sergeant Wood placed a Maxim gun between Nos. 3 & 4 sections.
On Sunay 11th February 1900, Major Edwards was sent to occupy Stubbs' Hill and Captain Hovell with A company of the Worcester Regiment, left a 2.30 a.m. to take over from him on the centre section.
Extract from the Times, June 2 nd 1900 - "Bivouac"
"The Times of February 14 th contained a letter reflecting on the bad shooting of our men in South Africa, so I should like to relate an experience to the opposite effect, and to suggest that the shooting of our men in this campaign probably depends on the musketry training they have previously received. On February 12 th my company, who with a strength of over 120, have happily averaged over marksman's points in the annual musketry course, was one of the three which occupied kopjes in the shape of a letter T. One company occupied the top T, which rose in peaks commanding the stem; the position of mine was the upper part of the stem, the third company held the lower half.
Before dawn the enemy attacked the top of the T in overwhelming numbers, driving our men to the right end of it ; from corroborative statements from Free Staters who have now laid down their arms, over 2,000 took part in the fight. On day breaking they opened fire on the upper end of the stem, a range of 550 yards (500m). By this time the men who were here were dotted about in one and two’s under cover of the rocks and bushes all along the top and sides of the ridge, those behind on higher ground than those in front, the company occupying a depth of 600 yards (550m). These positions were maintained till evening with a few changes to meet any movements of the enemy. The ranges were taken with the mekometer. Two of my section-commanders had each a limb of a Zeiss stereoscopic telescope, which proved invaluable, as they were enabled to keep these strong glasses fixed on the enemy's position with their heads safe under cover of the rocks and watch for any enemy to show himself behind the bushes or between rocks ; then they would warn their men where to fire. My men fired 4000 rounds. The enemy's fire was incessant throughout the day, but badly directed, by far the greater portion of their shots being directed overhead.... On visiting these kopjes a month later, and going over our and the enemy's positions, I was strongly reminded of Carter's `Story of the Transvaal War,' describing the battle of Ingogo in 1881: `the boulders which sheltered our men were whitened with lead, but from the bullet-marks on the rocks behind which the Boers took cover, I cannot ascribe similar good shooting from our side.' In the present case the results were reversed. Empty cartridge-cases showed what had been the position of each man on either side. On our kopje the bullet-marks were few and far between, but every rock which had afforded cover for the Boers, shown by empty Mauser-cases, was covered with bullet-marks. On going up one of the peaks, our attention was attracted to a long thick line of bullet-marks extending for several yards.
The reason of their appearing there appeared curious, till turning about, one saw that one was just behind a crest-line of a dip in the ground which the enemy occupied, and in line with the positions from which our men fired, so these were bullets that had just skimmed over their heads. Nor had all these bullets which had narrowly missed the enemy been useless. Their incessant splash doubtless had kept back those of the enemy who were not hit from advancing. They retired at dusk altogether. We know now that it had been their intention to have taken all the kopjes of the T."
10-14th February 1900
Van Rensberg's account:
“Early in February Clements came with 4½ battalions of infantry, two batteries of mounted soldiers, and about 600 Aussies. He divided his force into an east wing under Col. Carter, and a west section under Haklet-Pain. Clements was in command of the Colesberg Central.
Boer positions on 10 th February:
West wing: Com. Grobler
Central Chief: Comdt P.de Wet
Middle East: Gen. Schoeman
East: Gen. De La Rey with Gen. Lemmer and Celliers under him.
Far East: Col. Van Dam (Zarps)
Gen. de la Rey started preparing the east flank in the vicinity of Holle River. The joint attack by Gen. de la Rey, Grobler and Schoeman was planned for 10 th February at 2.00am. To the utmost embarrassment of Gen. de la Rey, Schoeman turned up much later, and the whole attack had to be abandoned due to the untrustworthiness of the Boer General. The attack was rescheduled for the 12 th February. At the west flank Clements was scared off when Pink Hill at Acacia was besieged, and considered to fall back. On 12 th February at the so-called Worcester Hill, a range of three hills, Signal-, Pinnacle- and Burnt Hill, the forces clashed.
Arrangements were:
Van Dam: to go to Burnt Hill
Coetzee: Signal Hill
Pietersen: Pinnacle Hill
At 3.00am the berghers started to climb the hills. At 3.30am the British guard woke up, and alarmed everybody. Despite heavy fire the ZARPSs reached Burnt Hill and Signal Hill. Luit Bartholomew tried to regain Burnt Hill, but did not succeed. At daybreak Stubb, notwithstanding a very good fight, was pushed back slowly towards the plateau and Pinnacle Hill. The Boers took over the field gun, and used it against the enemy. The Worcester Regiment, with 450 sharp shooters in their regiment, fought bravely and wanted to regain the lost field - to no avail. Col Stubbs fell, Col Conyngham succeeded him, he too was killed. That afternoon the Howitzers had the hill on fire - the bushes took fire - and the berghers had to retreat.
The Worcester Regiment lost 3 officers, 22 men and more than 50 wounded. At Stormfontein about 3 km south of the road these dead were buried, later reinterred.
The British drew back and Stubbs Hill between Raasfontein and Vergelegen was seized. The berghers broke through Jasfontein at the west wing on Febr 11th, they took Pink Hill at Acacia from Bastersnek. The Australians fought bravely, but had heavy losses - 3 officers out of 5,one being Eddy.
According to British reports the Boer attacks were unsuccessful, but on 13 th February they decided to fall back to Rensberg. The message did not reach everyone, and confusion occurred to such an extent that 2 companies of the Wiltshires were being cut off and encircled while they were still in the camp. A division from Johannesberg discovered them and started firing. They fled and bumped into some more berghers.
They would not surrender, and split into small groups. Their leader Col MacMullen fell, the wounded and dead came to 57, while 103 were captured. Mounted troops and 2 field guns were sent to Arundel, but they were too late. On 14 th February the British were back at Arundel, where they left 6 weeks ago.”
Van Dam’s account:
"Several times Gen. de la Rey discussed the plans of attack with me. In front of us the plain stretched till at the foot of the rise that we had to cross. Thus we were exposed to the maxims long before we could reach the rise. It was uncertain if we would be able to get that far. I put that to de la Rey, also that I was of meaning that we should, in my opinion, attack from the northern point. And then I thought that we should attack at night, which will offer a better chance, with lesser or no losses.
My request was granted, and seeing that the next day was Sunday we extended the attack to the night of Sunday. That evening we received a message from Luit Oosthuyzen, that he drove the enemy out of a section of his camp, but he could do no more.
Although the enemy used Liddites and grenades the position Oosthuyzen had was very good and there were no losses. Sunday afternoon I went with Gen.s Lemmer and Coetzee to a spot 100 yards from the rise that we planned to attack. Due to the shape of this rise it was possible to go up at three sections. The rise was in the form of an upside 7, with the hollow upwards, the left side about 50 yards and that went down to the plain, the right side had a length of about 500 yards, till where it sloped towards the plain. The half circle was flat at the top, about 20 yards, from where that also sloped towards the plain.
Thus it was necessary to occupy both ends as well as the centre. Luit Coetzee was to take the right flank, thus I explained the plan to him, also because he was a policeman from Pretoria and I did not know much about him.
Sunday night I left the camp with 215 men. The horses were not needed, as it was only 4 miles, and we marched to the hill, and waited for the moon to set. At midnight Gen. Lemmer turned up with 60 berghers. The general would stay at the hill and they agreed that I would light a fire as soon as we reached the top, thus explaining our position to the artillery when they started firing at day break. The moon went under at three o'clock.
Luit Coetzee and 100 men were to go up the height at the western end, 60 berghers and 15 police under Luit Jacobs, the east side, and I and my men the centre. It was made very clear to all officers that there should be no hesitation, whatever the circumstances. With even the least hesitation of the two sides, the position of the centre would be in great danger, without a chance to pull back. It was also crucial that they had to move in the utmost silence, giving them the opportunity to go as far as possible. Were they discovered, every division had to go forward as fast as possible.
When they reached the top they would be on the same level as the enemy, but because the terrain was unknown to all, they had to wait for light. All the flanks who did not want to take a detour, disappeared in the dark, and five minutes later the centre followed. As far as the beginning of the rise, the plain was covered with a soft grass, and there was no fear for discovery, unless the enemy had a guard below in the plain. Unworried we reached the start of the rise and stopped for a moment to determine whether the two sides had reached the foot. No time was to be wasted, and order was given to advance.
From the foot halfway to the top, the hill was covered with small loose stones that that rolled under the feet of the men. Higher up the there appeared to be large boulders, so high in some places that the berghers had to help one another. The rolling stones did cause a noise, but apparently the British did not take it to heart, and the berghers were able to advance till ten yards off the front line before – ‘Halt who goes there?’ was heard. The answer was a volley from the men in front, who shouted a loud - Hurrah -and stormed towards the front line.
The enemy fired a few shots and then started running away, leaving 8 or 10 men behind. They were taken prisoner and made to sit quietly. One bergher indicated a rock to a prisoner saying "sit vriend jy is nou veilig" (sit friend, you are now safe). I asked the bergher what he wanted to do with the Brit, and his answer: "Kommandant ek wil hom mak maak en leer Hollands praat" (Comdt. I want to tame him and teach him to speak Dutch). Leaving the prisoners under guard the police, shouting loudly to scare the enemy, charged to the top of the hill, where they took cover behind the loose boulders.
It was too dark for either side to see anyithing and the firing stopped. The bughers then lit a fire to let their forces know their position. Up to now I did not hear anything from the flanks, and I was worried. Did they get lost? They could see the signal for miles. The berghers on the top could not go any further without the flanks. The darkness made way for the light and what I was afraid of, happened. Diagonally left behind them, from the front and from right, the enemy started a serious firing.
At short distance a maxim sent a stream of bullets, we could not retreat, but fortunately the rocks provided enough shelter, otherwise we would all have been shot down within minutes. I managed to move a short way back down the hill and noted that Coetzee and the field-cornet were lying at the foot of the hill, but I could not reach them. As they were only 200 yards from where I stood, I tried shouting orders to them.
Gen. Lemmer who was about 1,000 yards from me heard my shouting so clearly that afterwards he spoke to me, accusing me of using "warm woorde" (cursing). I denied this. The police were waiting for orders from their officer but because he made no move. I called on the next in command, who immediately jumped up, and very soon they pushed the enemy, at that side, back.
On the left side it was the same. Nothing could get the field cornet and Luit Jacobs to go forward, and I called the police. One of the men - Murray - immediately jumped up, and followed the others, attacked the weak point, and within ten minutes the enemy was retreating, leaving the advantage of the front in the hands of the Boers. The cowardice of the officers spoiled the whole well-planned scheme, the surprise of an attack at three sides would have given them the greatest advantage, and less losses of lives.
Previously the behaviour of Luit Jacobs at Nicholsons Neck in Natal had caused me to send him back to Johannesberg. He was given a second chance, which his behaviour on Worcester Hill, shows he did not deserve. Lieut. Coetzee was also sent away - I never heard anything about him again. Their divisions were given to two men - the one led by a Sergeant Major, and the other a private.
Meanwhile a field gun was brought to the plain to fire at the British on the rise, but instead of that, the aiming was directing to me and my men, the artillery not knowing that they were at the edge. A smoke sign soon put the error right. Using every possible shelter, we started advancing, when all of a sudden, out of an unexpected position, we came under a strong attack. About 700 yards, east from the hill, there was a high peak supposed to be occupied by the berghers. When my division started climbing towards the peak, we discovered that several British soldiers were there already. These soldiers, being above us, were in a much better position and opened a steady fire on our men, while at the same time the flanks also started firing at us. A maxim we could not locate, gave us a hard time. When we managed to pin point its position, at about 100 yards to the right, I asked for volunteers to take it down, and three men started towards the shelter. From the out side they quietly took the stones down, took the maxim and captured a sergeant and two men.
Because they already had several losses, I decided to keep our position till the evening. At about noon the enemy at Slingersfontein started firing with four field guns but the distance was relatively short between the British and the berghers, so they had to be careful not to hit their own troops, thus all the grenades went overhead. At three o'clock a Howitzer was added, and the Liddites put fire to the dry grass. The smoke in the eyes of the Boers caused them to fall back. A few men were left behind at the end where the smoke was a little less, to keep guard just incase the enemy intended to attack under cover of the smoke. This was what happened, but, warned by the guards, the berghers pushed the enemy back, and the guards once again took position.
The field gun fire lasted the whole day and more than 250 grenades and Liddites were fired but little harm was done, the only accident on the side of the Boers being a stone was tugged loose by a Liddite, and caused a rent in the trousers of the bergher. When darkness fell, the field gun fire stopped and l4 captives as well as the maxim was being sent to the camp. A few men were sent to the peak of the hill, and came back to report that everything was desolate.
At midnight they cautiously crawled to the shelters but there was no enemy to be seen. When the moon was low enough to give shadows on the inside, the enemy drew back, leaving 9 dead [that the berghers buried], 1 heliograph, a few guns and ammunition. The loss of the enemy was officially given as; 37 dead and 81 wounded. The berghers; 8 dead and 19 wounded.
At 5 o'clock we received report that the enemy left Slingersfontein during the night, and the whole Colesberg laager moved back to Rensberg. bergher Commando's followed up and drove them as far as Rietfontein, with loss of 200 captives.
Thus the plan of de la Rey was successful and for the time being, the Free State was safe on this side."
British report:
From a report published in the Times, 2 nd June 1900 "Bivouac"
"On February 12th my company, who with a strength of over 120, was one of the three which occupied kopjes in the shape of a letter T. One company occupied the top T, which rose in peaks commanding the stem ; the position of mine was the upper part of the stem, the third company held the lower half. Before dawn the enemy attacked the top of the T in overwhelming numbers, driving our men to the right end of it. On day breaking they opened fire on the upper end of the stem, a range of 550 yards. By this time the men who were here were dotted about in one and twos under cover of the rocks and bushes all along the top and sides of the ridge, those behind on higher ground than those in front. My men fired 4000 rounds."
After several unsuccessful attempts to remove the Boers firing on them from Burnt Hill - the Worcesters remained pinned down for the rest of the day. Colour Sergeant Handley the only survivor of a charge by Major Stubbs in an attempt to recapture Burnt Hill – reported as follows :
" About 9 am on the 12th, Major Stubbs came to me and told me that Burnt Hill had to be retaken. I asked him what men were to do it, and he replied – ‘the men on either side of us’ - We were then lying down under the crest line west of the plateau. I then asked him how many men were at hand, and he replied ‘about half a dozen.’ He then told me to pass the word to fix bayonets, and that when he gave the word, they were all to rush forward.
The Major then commenced to crawl forwards, and when he reached the crest line, sprang to his feet shouting ‘Come on lads.’ He was then 20 or 30 yards in advance of any one. The men were extended 10 paces or so, covering about 80 yards in all. We sprang up and rushed forward, when a terrific fire was opened on us from the left front at about 00 yards range. The Major was hit and fell almost immediately, the man on his left falling at the same time. I shouted to the remainder to drop, as I couldsee we could not possible reach the foot of Burnt Hill alive, much less take it. The Major was, I believe shot dead, but it was impossible to reach him to ascertain."
Colonel Coningham was sent to replace Stubbs, but he was shot through the heart when he tried to see what was going on after he joined Lieutenant Bartholomew on Pinnacle Hill. By noon the persistent fire from the British guns had pushed the Boers back from the faces of Observation and Burnt Hills but it was a loosing battle for E company on Pinnacle Hill. They had no food and little water that day. The Boer fire was so hot they could not get to the wounded. By 6 p.m. the order came to retire and count their losses. Van Dam reports that he found :
"9 bodies, a heliograph, guns and ammunition left behind by the British as they retreated.”
E company's losses out of 95 men were reported as, 15 killed, 23 wounded and 8 prisoners. The reported Boer losses were 8 dead 19 wounded.
On the Boer side De la Rey's forces were moving into place. With a strong force of Johannesberg Police and Free Staters De la Rey planned to attack the eastern sides of Burnt Hill. Schoeman - in command of Colesberg - and his men were to attack the British centre. Celliers was ordered to work around the rear of Slingersfontein, while Grobler was to attacked the British left.
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